Victory came quickly to the CIA and special forces in October 2001. Then the mission changed to a self-defeating invasion.
Excerpt
Messrs. Seeger and Tyson knew that imposing American solutions on Afghanistan wouldn’t work. They managed tribal rivalries but didn’t seek to turn Afghan leaders into paragons of virtue. The U.S. role wasn’t to defeat the Taliban for the Afghans. It was their fight and their country.
Victory came quickly. So did warnings of the pitfalls of deeper American involvement in Afghanistan—ethnic rivalries, false surrenders, mistreatment of prisoners and errant bombs. In December 2001, Hamid Karzai, the U.S.-backed new president of Afghanistan, sought to strike a deal with the remnants of the Taliban, a practice consistent with Afghan tradition. The Bush administration blocked the deal, branding the entire Taliban as terrorists no different from al Qaeda.
At that juncture, the U.S. could have negotiated from a position of strength. Instead, 20 years later, the Biden administration is rushing for the exits, desperate to secure a deal that amounts to surrender.
The tragedy of the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan is that days after 9/11, President George W. Bush had settled on a plan based on principles that could have ensured enduring success.