Democrats blame Trump, but their policies would create more opportunities for the selling of favors.
But what makes such conduct possible in the first place? Democrats rightly blame the man.
But there is another culprit. The power of the federal government, which commands the fate of every major enterprise in America. A tariff waiver can mean billions for one company and bankruptcy for its rival. An antitrust filing can erase a decade of shareholder value in an afternoon. A procurement decision can build a company, and a regulatory finding can bury one. When the government holds that much influence, officials need not even demand tribute. Tribute arrives on its own.
The problem arose long before 2025. When government can make or break a business, businesses will invest in making friends with government, and the return on a lobbyist will exceed the return on an engineer. Corruption and discretionary power go hand in hand.
…The Democratic Party rejects that remedy. Its answer to the corruption it decries is personnel: Elect us, and we will staff the agencies with people of integrity. The claim deserves scrutiny rather than applause.
James Buchanan, who received the 1986 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, and Gordon Tullock argued in their 1962 book, “The Calculus of Consent,” that politicians and bureaucrats respond to incentives just as merchants and consumers do. … Voters may imagine that office transforms self-interest into public spirit, but no mechanism exists to perform that transformation. The behavior of officials is governed by what the office rewards, not by what the campaign promised.
Friedrich Hayek, another Nobel laureate, carried the argument further in “The Road to Serfdom” (1944). A state that dispenses fortunes will attract the people most eager to dispense them; positions of discretionary power select for those who relish wielding it. Screening for virtue can’t prevent that, because the applicant pool is already sorted by appetite, and the appetite grows with the budget.
The Democrats’ proposed programs would let officials choose which factories rise. Subsidies for favored technologies would let officials choose which investors prosper. Price regulation would let officials decide which companies earn a profit—and which don’t. Every one of these tools gives officials more decisions to sell, and every decision worth money to a business is a decision some business will pay to shape. A party proposing to multiply the levers of economic power is proposing to multiply the buyers lining up to pull them.
The question for Democrats …is what feature of their program would prevent similar conduct under a president of either party. Their platform contains no such feature, demanding instead more agencies, more waivers, more approvals—more of the raw material from which favors are minted. To the question “Why would your government be cleaner?” the answer “because we are better people” isn’t convincing. It is a request for faith that Buchanan and Tullock’s public-choice theory gives us every reason to withhold.
The Founders foresaw figures like Mr. Trump. They did not foresee a government of the current scope and size. The way to end the sale of government favors is to close the store. Until one of our parties says so, the outrage will remain what it is today: sincere and useless.
Mr. Tupy is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.